

2012/10/18 : CIA-RDP10T01930R000600030015-5

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/O S	18 APR 1973	STAT
2			
3	DD/P TOS		
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5	DC/PW Sec Dir /cs		
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☒ ACTION	☐ DIRECT REPLY	☐ PREPARE REPLY
☐ APPROVAL	☐ DISPATCH	☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ COMMENT	☐ FILE	☐ RETURN
☐ CONCURRENCE	☐ INFORMATION	☐ SIGNATURE

Remarks:

For re-write

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Executive Officer

18 APR 1973

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2012/10/18 : CIA-RDP10T01930R000600030015-5

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Director of Security 4E 60 Hqs		
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☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: [] While I agree with the points in ycSTAT memorandum, I wonder if we have overlooked an important implication in the basic CRS paper, i.e., that the TS green sheet system in use for so long may require revision. Are we considering any changes that will simplify the system? -

With regard to your memorandum (attached), I am reluctant to forward it since it may provoke CRS into an unnecessary defense of the initial paper..

I suggest that we would get much more mileage from a brief summary of what OS is doing to handle the problem and, simultaneously, acknowledging CRS' concern about it.

Perhaps the memo could be condensed to a page or two and be a more suitable response. []

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Assistant Deputy Director for Management and Services, 7D 24 Hqs, []	17 APR 1973

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for Top Secret Materials

FROM:

Director of Security
4E-60, Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

13 APR 1973

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. ADD/M&S
7D-24, Hqs.2. ADD/I
7E-44, Hqs.3. D/CRS
2E-60, Hqs.

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13 APR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Reference Service

THROUGH : Assistant Deputy Director for
Management and Services

: Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence

SUBJECT : Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for Top Secret Materials

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Director, Central
Reference Service, dated 14 March 73,
same subject (DDI-703-73)

1. Reference:

a. Cites the proposal before the Director of Central Intelligence to remove from TK compartmented control a large volume of classified material and suggests that upon decontrol such material may require Top Secret handling;

b. Notes the potential problem in handling such a large volume of material in accordance with existing Agency Top Secret control procedures; and

c. States that the DD/I wishes "rationalization of the Agency system for control and accountability of Top Secret collateral materials."

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2. This memorandum is designed to provide you with a status report on the Office of Security's review of Agency Top Secret control procedures and to express the direction which our intentions in this area are taking. In addition our comments may help to alleviate the fears outlined in reference about "Green Sheet" accountability for enormous volumes of material in the Intelligence Directorate.

3. I believe that the "Worst Case" example described in paragraph 3 of reference exaggerates the portents of the proposal now before the Director. First of all, approval of this proposal is still speculative in that it is dependent not only upon the persuasion of the Director but also on the results of USIB consideration and on the judgment of the President. Secondly, even if the proposal obtains Presidential endorsement, its contents would make any TK material removed from compartmented control classified and handled under the provisions of Executive Order 11652. The criteria of Executive Order 11652 for determining classification level suggest that the majority of substantive intelligence information decontrolled under the proposal would properly fall into a classification category less than Top Secret. While some would necessarily be Top Secret, I believe this would represent only a small percentage.

4. I enthusiastically support the case to remove from compartmented TK control the material identified in the proposal; at the same time I emphatically feel that such decontrolled material should be classified at the proper level according to Executive Order 11652 criteria. To merely transfer such material in toto from compartmented control to the equally restrictive Top Secret control environment would be counter-productive.

5. Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive support a concept under which national security information will be realistically protected. Fundamental to this concept is the desire to classify information lower and less than previously, but to afford better security to

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that segment of the total which warrants strict protection. Under this concept the Top Secret classification deserves the highest form of protection. To transfer from compartmented control the material identified in the proposal before the Director en masse and to abolish existing Top Secret control procedures would fundamentally challenge the effectiveness of the concept.

6. As you note in reference, the Office of Security assumed responsibility for the management of the Agency's Top Secret control program on 1 March 1973. We are reviewing existing accountability controls and procedures and intend to streamline these procedures to make them less cumbersome but effective. Based on our initial survey of the Top Secret mechanism our plan for changes is twofold:

a. Headquarters Regulation [redacted]

[redacted] is being revised. The planned revision will suggest the elimination of many of the mechanical aspects of existing control procedures which the DD/I may have associated with his typification of the system by the "Green Sheet." Specifically, one of the simplifications to be proposed is the elimination of cover sheets.

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b. In developing a revised Top Secret control mechanism, we hope to establish an Agency-wide computer-based system, which will maintain a current record of all Top Secret collateral material. We do not intend that this system will control the flow of such material within the Agency, other than the fact that it exists somewhere in inventory.

7. Movement toward these objectives is dependent upon the cooperation of the several directorates insofar as this is an Agency-wide problem. Further, parallel efforts are taking place

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
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which will affect our progress, e.g., the efforts of the Task Force chaired by [REDACTED] which is reviewing compartmented controls.

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8. Your continued support of our efforts in this area is appreciated.

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Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADD/M&S
1 - ADD/I

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REFERENCE

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DDI-703-73

DD/S 73-1051

14 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH: Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for TS Materials

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to state that the DDI wishes rationalization of the Agency system for control and accountability of Top Secret collateral materials--a system typified by the "green sheet."

2. We expect approval by the DCI of the proposal to remove from the TKH compartment much of the substantive intelligence information contained therein, and classification of this material according to content as required by E.O. 11652. The possibility that an undetermined portion of this material will thereafter be classified as TS collateral brings in sharp focus the need to revise a system which we consider too cumbersome to cope with a heavy load of additional documents.

3. To illustrate briefly the impact the TKH decompartmentation proposal could theoretically have on the TS system, let me cite some statistics. CIA's Central Top Secret Control disseminated in 1972 a total of 688 TS (including NATO, SEATO, CENTO SECRET) items to an average of six dissemines per item. The total green-sheeted items therefore amounted to approximately 4,128 per year. Your people estimate this

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SUBJECT: Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for TS Materials

at only 15% of the actual Agency flow (DDO being the largest source outside CRS). The total Agency figure would probably be in the area of 27,500 green-sheet copies. The volume of TKH cables, OAKs, and hard copy reports currently disseminated by CRS throughout the Agency, however, is estimated at approximately 430,000 copies! The volume of additional green sheets added to the Agency Top Secret Control System could therefore vary from 1 to 430,000, depending on the decision of the classifiers. The existing system is already cumbersome to a degree that affects effective use of material contained by the "green sheets." Further growth will from necessity require modification of the system. The modification should be deliberate and ordered. If not, it will be casually achieved through circumvention with the inevitable problems that would then result.

4. The Office of Security recently assumed responsibility for management and policy in Top Secret Control matters. CRS's Dissemination Branch continues to staff and control the dissemination function for TS. Office of Security's newly appointed Top Secret Control Officer has been surveying existing accountability controls and procedures with the aim of making recommendations for improving the system. Additionally, Compartmented Information Branch has for several months been reviewing control procedures for both codeword and collateral materials. These efforts indicate that OS itself has under way actions intended to improve the handling of classified materials.

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SUBJECT: Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
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5. The imminence of considerably heavier document loads into the TS control system, however, clearly indicates the need for higher priority to such actions. [redacted] of your staff has already been contacted by [redacted], Chief of our Acquisitions and Dissemination Division, about the concern of the DDI with green sheets and the urgency of action because of the TKH proposal. [redacted] has indicated that he and his staff are already at work on the problem, particularly with respect to the new strictures on classification and controls laid down by E.O. 11652. He has also indicated the utility of a more formal request for action from the DDI. This memorandum can be so regarded.

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6. My staff is available for any assistance this project may require. The experience of our Dissemination Branch personnel may be of value in designing a more rational and practical TS control system. [redacted] is available for such support as OS may desire.

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H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

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